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DTA-HOC: Online HTTPS Traffic Service Identification Using DNS
in Large-Scale Networks
Xuemei Zeng, Xingshu Chen , Guolin Shao, Tao He, and Lina Wang
Abstract: An increasing number of websites are making use of HTTPS encryption to enhance security and privacy
for their users. However, HTTPS encryption makes it very difficult to identify the service over HTTPS flows,
which poses challenges to network security management. In this paper we present DTA-HOC, a novel DNS-based
two-level association HTTPS traffic online service identification method for large-scale networks, which correlates
HTTPS flows with DNS flows using big data stream processing and association technologies to label the service in
an HTTPS flow with a specific associated domain name. DTA-HOC has been specifically designed to address three
practical challenges in the service identification process: domain name ambiguity, domain name query invisibility,
and data association time window size contradictions. Several experiments on datasets collected from a 10-Gbps
campus network are conducted alongside offline and online testing. Results show that DTA-HOC can achieve an
average online association rate on HTTPS traffic of 83% and a generic accuracy of 86.16%. Its processing time
for one minute of data is less than 20 seconds. These results indicate that DTA-HOC is an efficient method for
online identification of services in HTTPS flows for large-scale networks. Moreover, our proposed method can
contribute to the identification of other applications which make a Domain Name System (DNS) communication
before establishing a connection.
Key words: HTTPS; Domain Name System (DNS); service identification; big data; flow association
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Introduction

Network traffic service identification is an important
basis for monitoring and understanding the composition
of network traffic[1] . It is therefore significant for
network supervision and network service quality
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guarantees. With the enhancement of user privacy
protection and network security awareness, encrypted
traffic represented by HTTPS has continued to grow
significantly over recent years. More than half of
the world’s web traffic is currently transmitted using
HTTPS[2, 3] . HTTPS encryption makes it very difficult
to identify the service over HTTPS flows using
traditional methods, such as packet decryption and
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). Due to the major
challenge that this poses for network supervision,
HTTPS traffic service identification issues are receiving
the attention of many researchers[4, 5] . A variety of
web fingerprint-based service identification methods
have been proposed. However, since these methods
can only identify web services present in a fingerprint
library defined in advance, they have poor flexibility
and scalability. Studies have shown that Domain Name
System (DNS) traffic can be used to classify HTTPS

@ The author(s) 2020. The articles published in this open access journal are distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

240

traffic by assuming that a web application will resolve
the IP address of the HTTPS server via a DNS query
before requesting an HTTPS flow[6] . By monitoring
DNS queries, HTTPS flows can be labelled by the
domain name associated with the IP address of the
HTTPS server. Thus, DNS-based HTTPS classification
methods do not require prior knowledge of a webpage
fingerprint and are therefore flexible and scalable. Some
existing methods first extract from DNS traffic the
client IP addresses, server IP addresses, domain names,
and the relationships among them, and save them in
a database or a customized data structure; an HTTPS
flow is then labelled by retrieving the domain name
from the database or the data structure using a pair
of client-server IP addresses (hereafter abbreviated as
.c; s/) as a key[7] . However, due to the widespread use
of various DNS caching mechanisms, the DNS queries
corresponding to some HTTPS flows occur much earlier
than the related HTTPS flow. Therefore, these methods
make use of a warm-up phase to cache the DNS queries
in advance so that DNS queries can be continuously
updated and cached in the system running process.
With an increase of system uptime, the accumulation
of DNS data causes a system performance degradation.
Some mechanisms have been designed to alleviate the
problem of the excessive amount of DNS data (e.g.,
data expiration removal and data structure capacity
limitations), but due to the fact that the pair .c; s/ is used
as the search key, these make DNS queries invisible
for some HTTPS flows in the identification process and
eventually result in a low flow association rate. As the
network size and bandwidth increases, the number of
nodes and simultaneous online users in a network grows
rapidly, and the number of DNS requests and flows
also rises. The problems identified in these methods
therefore become more serious over time, rendering
them unsuitable for large-scale network environments.
In view of the above problems, we propose a
DNS-based two-level association HTTPS traffic online
service identification method called DTA-HOC, which
is suitable for large-scale network environments. In
DTA-HOC, big data stream processing and association
technologies are applied to realize the processing and
association of massive DNS and HTTPS flows. First,
we propose a near-real-time stream processing mode
that uses an adjustable sliding time window to read DNS
and HTTPS flows, which can simultaneously meet the
two main requirements of online service identification,
namely, timeliness and dependence on long-term
DNS data. We then propose a two-level association
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mechanism based on two different associated keys,
which can address the problem that some HTTPS
flows cannot be associated due to domain name query
invisibility (which will be detailed in Section 3.2) in
the sliding time window. Furthermore, we designed an
HTTPS flow label determination method based on the
domain name request behaviours of clients for the twolevel association mechanism when handling domain
name ambiguity (which will be detailed in Section
3.1). Finally, we conducted several experiments using
datasets from a 10-Gbps campus network to verify
DTA-HOC. The experimental results show that the
association rate of DTA-HOC can reach 91.18% (or
99.84%, when the impact of DNS data collection points
on the association rate is ignored), the specific accuracy
for HTTPS traffic service identification can reach
61.64%, and the generic accuracy can reach 86.16%.
Moreover, the generic accuracy can reach 96.04% when
multiple candidates are considered. When DTA-HOC
was deployed in the 10-Gbps campus network, the
average online association rate of HTTPS traffic in
the actual campus network reached 83% and the data
processing time per minute is less than 20 seconds.
These experimental results indicate that DTA-HOC is
an efficient method for the online identification of
services in HTTPS traffic for large-scale networks.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We propose a two-level online association
mechanism based on two different associated keys.
The two-level association mechanism makes it possible
to preserve the accuracy of the method with .c; s/
as the key and address the problem of domain name
query invisibility without caching DNS data for a long
period of time. Moreover, the mechanism solves the
problem that existing methods have of continuously
accumulating and updating DNS data.
(2) We propose a multi-candidate domain name
determination method for a two-level association
mechanism based on the domain name request
behaviours of clients. The method can address the
problem of domain name ambiguity and enables
DTA-HOC to achieve a higher service identification
accuracy. It also provides the capability of sorting all
candidate domain names. Thus, it is possible for one
or more candidate domain names to be assigned to the
associated HTTPS flows, better reflecting the service
over the HTTPS flow.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, related work regarding HTTPS traffic
service identification using domain names is briefly
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presented. In Section 3, we describe three problems in
DNS-based HTTPS traffic online service identification
in large-scale networks. We then highlight our proposed
HTTPS traffic service identification method DTA-HOC
and provide details of the implementation of its three
components in Section 4. In Section 5, we show the
experimental results and analyze the reasons for cases
of lack of association and failed service identification.
Finally, we conclude the work in Section 6.

2

Related Work

According to various sources of domain name
acquisition, the methods of identifying HTTPS traffic
service via domain names can be divided into two main
types: those based on the Server Name Indication (SNI)
field of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and those based
on DNS traffic.
SNI-based methods classify TLS applications or
HTTPS websites by extracting the domain name of
the SNI extension from the “client hello” packet in
the TLS handshake protocol. These methods aim to
identify the “client hello” packet and extract the SNI
information using DPI technology. SNI-based traffic
monitoring methods have been integrated into many
firewall solutions, such as Sphirewall[8] and IPFire[9] .
However, SNI is not a mandatory requirement of the
protocol, and SNI values can be easily forged to escape
the filtering of security mechanisms[10] . Moreover,
SNI is currently used alongside other information to
classify HTTPS traffic. For example, along with the
Common Name and other information in the HTTPS
communication certificate, SNI information is used to
create an HTTPS web page object fingerprint to identify
HTTPS web pages[11] . Additionally, SNI has been
used for service identification of HTTPS traffic after
its accuracy was verified via DNS data[12] . However,
since SNI-based methods must extract packet-level
data and process application-layer information, they
pose difficulties in large-scale network environments.
Therefore, these methods are not suitable for large-scale
networks.
DNS-based methods exploit the large number of
applications that use DNS to obtain the server IP
address and the rich information present in the clear
text transmission of DNS traffic. They extract the
relationship between the domain name and the server
IP address from DNS traffic and save it in a database
or custom data structure. When an HTTPS flow arrives,
the specified domain name is assigned to the flow by
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retrieving the record from the database or the data
structure, and then the service is identified from the
encrypted network traffic. At present, there is a few
researches based on this method; to the best of the
our knowledge, the following works are all that are
relevant. Plonka and Barford[6] were among the first to
propose DNS-based web traffic classification method.
In this method, each client’s DNS collection point
(i.e., Rendezvous) state information is collected and
stored in a tree-like data structure; then, a classification
label would be applied to each client-related web
flow. Trevisan et al.[7] discussed the role of server
IP addresses and hostnames to classify traffic on the
web and found that collisions of names and addresses
are common among popular services. However, they
only provided a first look into traffic classification for
modern web services and did not build a useable web
traffic classifier. Bermudez et al.[13] proposed a web
traffic classification system called DN-Hunter, which
uses a First-In First-Out (FIFO) Cycle List (CList) of
a given length to store a Fully Qualified Domain Name
(FQDN). DN-Hunter retrieves the FQDN of the most
recent entry from the CList with (c; s) as a key and
assigns the FQDN to the web flow as the label. It
has been applied in some real networks, but it has two
problems: (1) HTTP/HTTPS flows with an invisible
related DNS query cannot be correlated and labelled
due to the absence of the corresponding DNS query
stemming from the limitation of the CList’s max length;
and (2) the system can only return one FQDN as the
flow label for a given client-server pair, and so multiple
candidate FQDNs cannot be provided. Foremski et
al.[14] proposed a traffic classification system called
DNS-Class. DNS-Class saves the client IP addresses,
server IP addresses, and domain names acquired from
DNS flows in a database called Resolver and sets
(c; s) as an index key. Its flow tagging module then
labels each arriving flow by querying the domain
name in the Resolver. Since the mapping relationships
between the client IP addresses, server IP addresses,
and domain names need to be continuously inserted and
stored in the Resolver, and in the absence of a data
expiration deletion mechanism, the Resolver becomes
increasingly massive as the system runs. DNS-Class
therefore has obvious inefficiencies since DNS data
must be continuously written into the Resolver, which
is also queried frequently. Mori et al.[15] proposed an
encrypted web flow service inference framework called
SFMap, which is based on a Domain Name Graph

3

Problem Analysis

In large-scale network environments, online DNSbased HTTPS traffic service identification faces three
problems when associating an HTTPS flow with
the preceding DNS query: domain name ambiguity,
domain name query invisibility, and data association
time window size contradiction. In this section, we
discuss each of these problems in turn.
3.1

Domain name ambiguity

Increasing numbers of web services are now being
served from shared infrastructure such as Content
Delivery Networks (CDN) and cloud computing. These
web services often make use of the modern DNS
ecosystem to optimize their resources, which makes
many-to-many relationships between the server IP
address and the domain name very common in popular
services[16] . Approximately 35% of IP addresses
can be associated with multiple domain names[6] .
This phenomenon of an IP address being associated
with multiple domain names is called domain name
ambiguity in this paper. We analyzed domain name
ambiguity using DNS data collected from multiple time
periods (one hour per period) on the campus network.
As seen from Fig. 1a, as time passes, the proportion
of the total IP addresses that are mapped to multiple
domain names increases from 38% to 44%, until after
15 minutes, when the proportion gradually stabilizes
and remains in the range 42.5% to 44%. Figure 1b
shows a case in which an IP address is mapped to one

0.44
0.43
0.42
Ratio

(DNG). SFMap stores the dynamic relationships among
client IP address, server IP address, domain name,
and canonical domain name (CNAME) in the DNG.
The hostname of an HTTPS flow can be obtained by
searching the domain name in the DNG with a key
(c; s). Additionally, maximum likelihood probability is
used to address the hostname selection problem when
multiple hostnames are retrieved. SFMap obtains a
good flow tagging effect on datasets from local area
networks when prepared 10 hours in advance. If applied
in a large-scale network, the DNG would become very
large because all canonical domain names need to be
stored. Although DNGs have a dynamic deletion and
update mechanism based on the Time To Live (TTL) of
a domain name, the node deletion of the DNG is invalid
in some scenarios such as the UE-NTE. Therefore,
despite its high accuracy, SFMap is unsuitable for largescale networks.
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Fig. 1 Proportion of the total IP addresses that are mapped
to multiple domain names over time (in minutes). (a)
Proportion of the total IP addresses that are mapped to
multiple domain names over time; (b) Proportion of the total
IP addresses that are mapped to multiple domain names with
a public suffix over time.

domain name or multiple domain names with the public
suffix. The public suffix here refers to the combination
of the secondary domain and the root domain of the
FQDN. For example, the public suffix shared between
xxx.example.com and yyy.example.com is example.com,
where “example” is the secondary domain and “com” is
the root domain. As seen from Fig. 1b, the proportion
reduces from 82% to 80% over time, until after 15
minutes, when it gradually stabilizes, maintaining a
proportion between 79.5% and 80.5%.
Clearly there is a high probability of domain name
ambiguity in actual networks. Therefore, we need
to face the challenge of domain name ambiguity and
find a method to choose the correct domain name
from multiple options when labelling the service of
an HTTPS flow. But it is worth mentioning that the
existence of a public suffix can be used to label HTTPS
flows and mitigate the challenge at some degree, since
most IP addresses are either mapped to a single domain
name or to multiple domain names with a public suffix.

Xuemei Zeng et al.: DTA-HOC: Online HTTPS Traffic Service Identification Using DNS in Large-Scale Networks

3.2

Domain name query invisibility

The primary task of implementing DNS and HTTPS
associations is to determine a key. The existing method
is mainly based on the key (c; s); however, in an
actual network, the DNS system uses a variety of
caching mechanisms to cache DNS records, such as
local DNS resolvers, the DNS cache within an operating
system, and the DNS cache in applications such as
a web browser, which results in domain names not
being re-requested until their TLLs have expired[17] .
These caching mechanisms make domain name queries
invisible for some HTTPS flows during the data
observation period, which leads to the absence of the
corresponding DNS queries for some HTTPS flows.
3.3

Data
association
contradiction

time

window

size

In online traffic service identification, both a DNS
flow and an HTTPS flow arrive to the data processing
platform in real time; however, the DNS query
appears before the HTTPS flow. Thus, it is difficult to
establish the association between them according to the
one-to-one mechanism of streaming data processing.
To associate the two flows effectively, a batch of
flows arriving at a time must be obtained. The
timing relationship between an HTTPS flow and
the corresponding DNS flow in a real-time network
environment is shown in Fig. 2. For the current moment
t , a flow Flowi arrives in the HTTPS flows at the current
batch time window at tfi (tfi 6 t ). Assuming that the
duration of Flowi is Durationi , the start time of Flowi
is tStartTimei , and the TTL of the corresponding request
domain DRi is TTLn , the occurrence/arrival time of the
DNS response is then tdi D tfi Durationi ", where
" is the time difference between the DNS response
arrival time and the Flowi ’s start time tStartTimei , and

0 < " < TTLn ; when Flowi is the first HTTPS flow
after the DNS request, "  0. Thus, Flowi and DRi
can be associated only when the data association time
window size w has satisfied the condition w > t
tdi . In a real-world network scenario, various domain
cache mechanisms mean that "  0 for some HTTPS
flows, and Durationi will be larger when Flowi is a
long-time connection. Only under the condition of w >
Durationi C" can an HTTPS flow and its corresponding
DNS flow be associated successfully.
However, as the DNS time window size increases, the
proportion of IP addresses mapped to multiple domain
names also increases, and domain name ambiguity will
affect the service identification accuracy. Moreover, in
a large-scale network environment, when the associated
time window increases, a large number of flows
arriving at a high speed would increase both the
amount of data that need to be processed and the
calculation processing delay in each time slice, which
will reduce the timeliness of the association. Therefore,
the service identification method faces the problem of
data association time window size contradiction.

4
4.1

Proposed Approach
Approach overview

DTA-HOC is designed based on a distributed big data
real-time stream processing platform; the framework
structure is shown in Fig. 3. The framework of DTAHOC consists of three components: a stream data
extractor, a DNS flow processor, and a two-level
associator. The stream data extractor, which includes
a DNS flow extractor and an HTTPS flow extractor,
is responsible for reading the DNS and HTTPS flows
required by association from the specified network
streaming data buffers according to the given sliding
time window parameters. The DNS flow data processor
t8
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Window
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Level 2
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Batch
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Fig. 2 Time relationship between an HTTPS flow and the
corresponding DNS flow in a real-time network.
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Batch
at t
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t

HTTPS
flows

Fig. 3 Online association method DTA-HOC structure
overview.
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is responsible for parsing and processing the DNS flows
obtained by the DNS flow extractor and forming DNS
mapping relationship datasets Glevel1 and Glevel2 for
the two-level association based on the .c; s/ key and
the .s/ key, respectively. The two-level associator is
responsible for hierarchically associating the HTTPS
flows obtained by the HTTPS stream extractor with
Glevel1 and Glevel2 and identifying the HTTPS flow using
the associated domain name(s), thereby implementing
HTTPS flow service identification.
4.2 Stream data extractor
4.2.1 Streaming data reading and processing
modes
The micro-batch mode in big data stream processing
is used to buffer the incoming data into a container
according to the time window size and aggregate the
data dropped in the window to perform calculations.
It is suitable for the association analysis of DNS and
HTTPS flows in an online environment. In this paper,
the stream data extractor uses a sliding-window-based
micro-batch mode to read real-time DNS and HTTPS
flows. Let the DNS stream extractor process DNS flows
with the sliding window size w each time with a forward
step size x, and let the HTTPS stream extractor process
HTTPS flows with the sliding window size b each time
with a forward step size y. Because an HTTPS flow
only needs to be processed once, there is no intersection
between each batch of HTTPS flows (i.e., y D b).
After the flows are divided by each slice of the time
window, for the i -th time slice, the interval of the DNS
time window wi is .ti w; ti , and the time interval
of the HTTPS time window bi is .ti b; ti , where ti
is the right edge of the i-th time window. To ensure
synchronization of the DNS and HTTPS time windows
for each time slice, the right edge of the windows is set
to be the same, and the sliding step size is x D y.
4.2.2

Data window size determination

In most scenarios, the same sliding time window size
is adopted to process the data from different sources.
However, since the DNS request arrives before the
HTTPS flow, most HTTPS flows in the beginning of
the time window will miss the corresponding DNS
records in the associated time window when w D
b. Increasing the size of the sliding window can
alleviate the effect of domain name query invisibility.
However, after the HTTPS sliding window size b is
increased, the data association needs to wait until the
right boundary condition of the sliding window is

satisfied before starting, which will delay the output
of the associated result and affect the real-time nature
of the association. Therefore, to meet the real-time
requirements of service identification and make the
DNS data of more HTTPS flows fall into the associated
time window, it is necessary to make b as small as
possible (to improve real-time performance) and w
as large as possible (to increase the association rate).
However, according to the previous analysis, increasing
w will increase the data processing time and affect
the service identification accuracy. Therefore, various
sliding window sizes for the DNS and HTTPS flows
are set in DTA-HOC. Figure 3 shows the stream data
extractor extracting DNS and HTTPS flows based on
sliding windows with various parameter values. In
DTA-HOC, b is determined according to the realtime requirement of service identification and the delay
in data association processing in the actual network,
and w is determined according to the distribution
of the TTL of the requested domain names, the
distribution of the duration of the HTTPS flows in the
actual network, and the data processing delay of the
data processing platform. According to the analysis
presented in Section 3.3, the conditions w > b and
w > TTLmost C Durationmost need to be satisfied, where
TTLmost refers to the TTL value of most of the requested
domain names in the actual network, and Durationmost
refers to the duration time of most of the HTTPS
flows. Therefore, we set w to be equal to a value
near TTLmost C Durationmost when considering the
performance of the actual data processing platform.
4.3

DNS flow processor

The DNS flow processor processes the output of the
DNS flow extractor in each time slice to form the DNS
mapping datasets Glevel1 and Glevel2 that are required by
the two-level associator. Dataset Glevel1 uses (c; s) as a
key to store the mapping from a client-server IP address
pair to a request domain name. Dataset Glevel2 uses (s)
as a key to store the mapping from a server IP address
to a request domain name.
4.3.1

Two-level association DNS mapping datasets

Let C represent the set of all client IP addresses
that have DNS request behaviour in the sliding time
window. For a specific client IP ci with ci 2 C ,
the server IP address set Sci is obtained from the
DNS request/response in the time slice. According
to domain name ambiguity, for a specific server IP
address sj with sj 2 Sci , there are one or more
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domain names pointing to it. Let the domain name
set Nci ;sj D fnm
ci ;sj j1 6 m 6 Nnumci ;sj g refer to
all domain names pointing to sj requested by client
ci , where nm
refers to one of the domain names
ci ;sj
pointing to sj in the time slice, and Nnumci ;sj refers
to the numbers of the distinct domain names in the
time slice. Based on the idea of MapReduce in big
data, we use the structure ŒKey; Value to express the
mapping relationship between two objects. Therefore,
the mapping relationship between the pair .ci ; sj / and
the requested domain name set Nci ;sj can be expressed
as rci ;sj D Œ.ci ; sj /; Nci ;sj , where Key D .ci ; sj /
ci ;sj
and Value D Nci ;sj D .n1c ;s ; n2c ;s ; : : : ; nNnum
/.
ci ;sj
i j
i j
When Nnumci ;sj D 1, the .ci ; sj / pair only maps to
one domain name nci ;sj , and we can use nci ;sj as the
label of the HTTPS flows associated in the current time
slice. Additionally, when Nnumci ;sj > 1, we select one
or multiple domain names as the label of the associated
HTTPS flows according to the candidate domain name
determination method (detailed in Section 4.3.3). We
in the set
set a score ! for each domain name nm
ci ;sj
Nci ;sj according the behaviour of the client ci , and
sort all domain names in Nci ;sj by the value of !.
Accordingly, the final expression of rci ;sj is shown as
Eq. (1):
rci ;sj DŒ.ci ; sj /; ..n1c ;s ; !c1 ;s /; .n2c ;s ; !c2 ;s /; : : : ;
i

Nnumci ;sj

.nc

i ;sj

j

i

Nnumc ;s
; !ci ;sj i j

j

i

j

i

//

j

(1)
Nnumc

;s

where !c1i ;sj > !c2i ;sj >    > !ci ;sj i j . Thus, the
mapping relationship dataset Glevel1 , which includes all
the mapping relationships rci ;sj in the time slice, can be
expressed as Glevel1 D f rci ;sj jci 2 C; sj 2 Sci g.
Mapping relationship rs0j will be formed when
ignoring the constraint of the client on the mapping
relationship rci ;sj , and its expression is shown as
Eq. (2):
rs0j D Œsj ; ..n1s ; !s1 /; .n2s ; !s2 /; : : : ;
j

j

Nnums
.nsj j

Nnumsj

; !s

j

j

//

j

(2)

Therefore, the mapping relationship dataset Glevel2 ,
which includes all mapping relationships rsj in the time
slice, can be expressed as Glevel2 D frsj jsj 2 S g, where
S refers to the set of all server IP addresses in the time
window.
Only the mapping relationship from the pair of
client IP addresses and the requested domain name
to the resolved server IP address can be directly
acquired from the DNS response. To generate datasets
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Glevel1 and Glevel2 , it is necessary to process the DNS
data, reverse the transformation mapping relationship
between domain names and server IP addresses, and
calculate the score ! of each candidate domain name.
Following is details of the process and calculation
method.
4.3.2

Mapping relationship reverse transformation

The mapping relationship reverse transformation
process is made up of two stages. The first stage is
to parse each DNS response record in the DNS data
and extract the client IP address, the requested domain
name, and the (one or more) server IP addresses pointed
to by the domain name, and then form a mapping from
the pair of client IP addresses and the domain name to
the server IP address(es). The second stage is to reverse
the mapping relationship between the domain name
and the server IP address to form multiple mappings
from the client-server pair to the domain name.
Let Respi refer to the i -th DNS response record in the
sliding time window. Thus, the mapping relationship
between the pair .c; s/ and the requested domain name
acquired by resolving Respi can be expressed as qi D
Œ.c; n/; .s1 ; s2 ; : : : ; sk /, where c refers to the client IP
address, n refers to the requested domain names, sk
refers to one of the resolved server IP addresses, and
k refers to the number of resolved server IP addresses
with k > 1. Thus, we can obtain mapping relationship
dataset Q by resolving all DNS response records within
the sliding time window and Q D fqi j1 6 i 6 Rnumg,
where Rnum refers to the number of all resolved server
IP addresses in the current sliding time window.
The reverse transformation process of the requested
domain name and the server IP address is shown in
Eq. (3). First, the one-to-many mapping relationship
of each qi in Q is decomposed into multiple one-toone mappings, as shown in (i) of Eq. (3). Then, the
reverse transform is taken for each resolved mapping
relationship from Œ.c; n/; s to Œ.c; s/; n, as shown in
(ii) of Eq. (3). Thus, the new mapping relationship
dataset is made available, composed of all mapping
relationships such as Œ.c; s/; n generated by processing
each element of Q through the two processes (i) and (ii)
in Eq. (3).
qi D Œ.c; n/; .s1 ; s2 ; : : : ; sk /
8
9 8
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4.3.3 Candidate domain name determination
As a matter of experience, we believe that for a given
time window, when the server IP address s obtained
by parsing client c corresponds to multiple domain
names, the most relevant domain name is that with the
highest frequency of requests. Therefore, based on the
client’s domain name request behaviour, the requested
frequency of the domain name is used to calculate
the score of each candidate domain name in Glevel1 .
Let Fc;s .n/ refers to the frequency with which domain
name n is queried by client c and resolved server IP
address s is obtained, then
W .Œ..c; s/; n/
Fc;s .n/=
(4)
W .Œ..c; s/; /
where W .B/ refers to the number of B occurrences
in set , and “” refers to any of the domain names.
Thus, the preferred service label of the HTTPS flow
associated with Glevel1 is nO subjected to rc;s and
maximizing Fc;s .n/; that is
(5)
nO D arg max Fc;s .n/
rc;s

Therefore, in Eq. (1), the first candidate domain
name n1ci ;sj is nO ci ;sj and !c1i ;sj D Fci ;sj .nO ci ;sj /, and
the score of the l-th candidate domain name nlci ;sj can
be calculated by !cl i ;sj D Fci ;sj .nlci ;sj /.
We determine the score of each candidate domain
name in Glevel2 , based on the domain name request
behaviour of all clients in the slide time window.
Therefore, the score of a domain name is calculated by
the domain name request frequency of all clients. Let
Fs .n/ refer to the frequency with which domain name
n is requested by all clients and resolve IP address s is
obtained in the slide time window, then
W .Œ.s; n/
Fs .n/=
(6)
W .Œ.s; /
Thus, the preferred service label of the HTTPS flow
associated with Glevel2 is the candidate domain name
n,
O and nO satisfies the mapping relationship rs0 and
maximizes Fs .n/; that is
nO D arg maxFs .n/
(7)
rs0

Therefore, in Eq. (2), the first candidate domain name
n1sj is nO sj , !s1j D Fsj .nO sj /, and the score of the l-th
candidate domain name nlsj can be calculated by !slj D
Fsj .nlsj /.
4.4

Two-level associator

The DTA-HOC two-level associator processes the
HTTPS flows read by the stream extractor and labels the
HTTPS flows by associating them with the DNS stream

processor outputs Glevel1 and Glevel2 . The first level is
associated based on the (c; s) key. After association,
HTTPS flows that were successfully associated are
marked and output, while HTTPS flows that were not
successfully associated in the first-level associator will
be fed to the second-level associator. The second-level
associator associates the HTTPS flows based on the
(s) key. The two-level association mechanism makes
full use of the advantage of (c; s)-based association (in
terms of accuracy) and (s)-based association (in terms
of association rate). It not only resolves the problem
of domain name query invisibility but also increases
the association rate to the same level as the (s)-based
association method in reducing the size of the DNS time
window used for association.

5
5.1

Experiments and Results Analysis
Experimental platform and datasets

In this paper, we performed experiments based on the
big data analysis platform NTCI-BDP established by
our laboratory. The platform is built on Hadoop and
Spark and has one master node and 14 data nodes. The
communication bandwidth between nodes is 10 Gbps.
To facilitate the evaluation and verification of the DTAHOC method, the experiments are performed both
offline and online. The data used in the experiments
was from the real environment of the authors’
campus network. Offline data includes DNS and HTTP
flow data. The main reasons for conducting offline
experiments using HTTP data instead of HTTPS data
are as follows: (1) HTTPS tag data sets and DNS
associated data sets for experimentation are lacking,
and manual data tagging is too costly; (2) the request
header of HTTP data contains the hostname information
requested by the client, which can be used as a label
for identifying the flow; and (3) although HTTP and
HTTPS differ in the distribution of hostnames, the
fundamental mechanism of resolving domain names
before starting HTTP/HTTPS communication should
be consistent[15] . Therefore, the accuracy of our method
can be evaluated by the method of associating DNS
data with HTTP data. The HTTP data in the experiment
comes from the HTTP flow records collected from the
campus network border router. The fields of each HTTP
flow include source IP address, destination IP address,
source port number, destination port number, number of
bytes, number of packets, flow start time, flow duration,
and HTTP request hostname. The campus network has
an export bandwidth of 10 Gbps, a traffic peak value that
can reach 14 Gbps, and an online local user peak value
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that can reach 35 000 per second. HTTP traffic accounts
for 35%–53% of the total traffic, and HTTPS traffic
accounts for 14%–22% of the total traffic. The DNS
data are collected from the campus network server area.
Three DNS servers are deployed in the area to provide
authoritative DNS mapping services for the data centre
business systems and domain name resolution services
for campus network users. The peak DNS response rate
of DNS traffic data is approximately 300 000 per min,
and the amount of different requested domain names is
approximately 21 000 per min. Offline data are stored
in Parquet format in HDFS. Real-time data includes the
DNS flows of the server area and the HTTPS flows of
the campus network border. The data are provided by
the streaming data platform built by Apache Kafka. The
experimental environment’s logical topology is shown
in Fig. 4. The experiment assumes that campus network
users normally use the local DNS server on campus to
access the Internet.
To simulate online data correlation scenarios to
conduct experiments, we used offline HTTP and DNS
data from four time periods on June 6, 2017 stored on
the big data platform NTCI-BDP. The data details are
shown in Tables 1 and 2. For ease of analysis, the HTTP
dataset filters the flows for which the request hostname
is empty or an IP address.
Campus network
border router

HTTP/HTTPS
stream
collection point
DNS stream
collection point
Local
DNS servers

Campus network
user area

Server area

Fig. 4 Logical network topology of the experimental
environment.

Time duration
10:00–11:00
16:00–17:00
20:00–21:00
3:00–4:00

Table 1
Number of HTTP flows
658 638
591 096
517 143
85 644

5.2
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Evaluation indices

DTA-HOC offers a refined classification of HTTPS
traffic. However, at present, encrypted traffic
identification is mainly evaluated by accuracy-related
indicators, which are relatively coarse. To evaluate the
effectiveness of the DTA-HOC method, we designed
nine indices to measure the degree of association
and the service identification accuracy of DTA-HOC.
Accuracy is split into two types: specific and generic.
The first indicates that the domain name assigned to an
HTTPS flow is the same as its requested hostname, and
the second indicates that the domain name assigned
to an HTTPS flow shares the public suffix as its
requested hostname. For a more fine-grained measure,
each accuracy index has two sub-indices, which are
represented by adding a 1 or 2 at the end of an indicator
symbol.
(1) Association rate (R). This refers to the ratio of
HTTPS flows associated with the DNS data to the total
number of flows. Let Z be the total number of HTTPS
flows in a given time window and M be the total
number of HTTPS flows associated with the DNS, then
R D M=Z. R is an index that reflects the degree of
association between DNS flows and HTTPS flows.
(2) Specific accuracy (A). Let C be the number of
HTTPS flows labelled correctly using the first candidate
domain name. The specific accuracy indices can be
expressed as A1 D C =M and A2 D C =Z and are
used to measure the service identification accuracy of
HTTPS flows by hostname.
(3) Generic accuracy (PSA). Let PS be the number
of HTTS flows labelled correctly based on the public
suffix. The generic accuracy indices can be expressed
as PSA1 D PS=M and PSA2 D PS=Z and are used to
measure the service identification accuracy of HTTPS
flows. It is meaningful to use PSA to measure the

Basic statistics of the HTTP dataset.
Number of servers
Number of clients
5221
11 261
5325
11 492
4594
9837
1345
1089

Table 2

Time duration
10:00–11:00
16:00–17:00
20:00–21:00
3:00–4:00

Basic statistics of the DNS dataset.
Number of distinct
Number of DNS responses
Number of clients
domain requests
12 629 110
214 918
33 334
13 197 486
224 025
34 483
11 358 331
194 534
28 647
2 589 382
69 324
10 979

Number of hostnames
6075
6148
5309
1307

Number of resolved
distinct server IPs
93 275
95 700
82 902
28 802
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we obtain an HTTP/HTTPS flow record is the end
time of the flow in an online environment. However,
an HTTP/HTTPS flow record only stores the flow’s
start time and duration, but not the flow’s end (or
arrival) time. Therefore, to accurately simulate the
online data scenario in an offline environment, an
HTTP flow record for association is extracted from
the offline datasets according to the condition that
the calculated value of the flow end time falls within
the time window. The formula for the flow end time
is end time D start time C duration. The parameters
in DTA-HOC include the DNS sliding time window
size w, sliding step size x, HTTP sliding time
window size b, and sliding step size y. The smaller
the value of the parameter b, the better the realtime performance; however, in a large-scale network
environment, near-real-time data service identification
is sufficient to meet the actual requirements. Therefore,
we set b D 1 as the HTTP sliding time window
parameter value. To determine parameter w, we firstly
analyzed the distribution of TTL of domain names
and the distribution of duration of HTTP flows of the
experimental datasets. Figure 5 reports the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of the value of TTL of the
requested domain names and Fig. 6 shows the CDF of
the value of the durations of HTTP flows. As shown
in Figs. 5 and 6, more than 95% of requested domain
names have a TTL value of less than 800 seconds
and more than 95% of HTTP flows have a duration

5.3
5.3.1

0

Estimation accuracy0 and
discussion
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200000 300000
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and
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According to the analysis in Section 3, the time when
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(a)
Zoom local

1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
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parametric

Global

1.0

CDF

service identification method because most multiple
domain names that point to the same IP address have
the public domain name suffix according to the analysis
in Section 3.1.
(4) Specific accuracy based on the first two (P2A).
Let P 2 be the number of HTTPS flows labelled
correctly using the first two candidate domain names.
The specific accuracy based on the first two indices can
be expressed as P2A1 D P 2=M and P2A2 D P 2=Z
and used to measure the service identification accuracy
of HTTPS flows.
(5) Generic accuracy based on the first two (P2SA).
Let P2S be the number of HTTPS flows labelled
properly using the first two candidate domain names
based on the public suffix. The generic accuracy based
on the first two indices can be expressed as P2SA1 D
P2S=M and P2SA2 D P2S=Z and are used to measure
the service identification accuracy of HTTPS flows.
(6) Specific accuracy based on the top three (P3A).
This index is basically the same as P2A, except that it
uses the first three candidate domain names. Let P 3 be
the number of HTTPS flows labelled correctly; then,
P3SA1 D P3S=M and P2SA2 D P3S=Z:
(7) Generic accuracy based on the top three (P3SA).
This index is basically the same as P2SA, except that
it uses the first three candidate domain names. Let P3S
be the number of HTTPS flows labelled properly; then,
P3SA1 D P3S=M and P3SA2 D P3S=Z:
(8) Specific accuracy based on the highest requested
frequency (FA). When calculating the score of a
candidate domain name according to Eq. (4) or Eq. (6),
there are some cases in which the probability of
multiple domain names is the same and is at the
maximum value. Let F be the number of HTTPS flows
labelled correctly using the candidate domains names
with the highest requested frequency; the specific
accuracy based on the highest requested frequency
indices can then be expressed as FA1 D F=M and
FA2 D F=Z:
(9) Generic accuracy based on the highest requested
Global
frequency (FSA). Let1.0FS be the number of HTTPS
flows labelled correctly
using the candidate domains
0.8
names with highest requested frequency based on
0.6
the public suffix. The generic accuracy based on the
0.4
highest requested frequency
indices can be expressed
as FSA1 D FS=M and0.2FSA2 D FS=Z.

CDF
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Fig. 5 Distribution of TTL of requested domain names. (a)
Overall view; (b) Local zoom at the beginning.
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Fig. 6 Distribution of duration of HTTP flows. (a) Overall
view; (b) Local zoom at the beginning.
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value less than 80 000 ms, while TTLmost CDurationmost
is equal to 880 seconds (14.67 min). Therefore, in
accordance with Section 4.2.2, we can set w D 15 as
the DNS sliding time window parameter value for DTAHOC in the current network environment. Additionally,
to maintain synchronization of the two data windows,
we set x D y D b.
To investigate the effect of data window size on the
association rate and accuracy, w is set to 1, 2, 3, 5,
10, 15, 20, 25, and 30 minutes and b is set to a fixed
value of 1 minute. The experimental results for different
values of w on four time periods of the experimental
datasets are shown in Fig. 7. The experimental results
show that correlation rate R and accuracy indicators
A1, A2, PSA1, and PSA2 increase as the time window
increases. When w < 15, the growth rate increases,
and then it tends to stabilize; when w > 15, the
service identification ability barely improves, and a few
indicators, such as A1, PSA1, and PSA2, decreased
slightly. Therefore, it is appropriate to set w D 15
for the networks before taking account of the data
processing delay. The data processing time on NTCIBDP is described in Section 5.4.
5.3.2 Experimental results
To verify our proposed method, we compare it with the
method based on the (c; s) key association (hereafter
referred to as BCS), the method based on the (s) key
association (hereafter referred to as BS), and the DNHunter method[13] using the evaluation indicators R,
A1, and A2. Note that BCS uses a client’s domain
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(c)

Fig. 7 Trends in evaluation indicators under varied DNS
sliding time window parameter. (a) Line graph of R versus
DNS time window size; (b) line graph of A1, A2 versus DNS
time window size; and (c) line graph of PSA1, PSA2 versus
DNS time window size.

name request behaviour to select the candidate domain
name for the associated HTTP flow, and BS uses all
client domain name request behaviours to perform this
task. Additionally, from the literature we choose DNHunter as the comparison method because currently
it is, to the best of our knowledge, the only method
that can be run in a large-scale network environment.
Since the existing related studies verified their methods
on datasets collected from specific non-public network
environments, we implemented BCS, BS, and DNHunter and ran them on the four datasets of this paper
for a comparative experiment. In accordance with the
discussion in the previous section, the parameters of
DTA-HOC, BCS, and BS in the comparison experiment
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are set as follows: w D 15, x D 1, b D 1, and y D 1.
The comparative experimental results data are shown in
Fig. 8.
The following conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 8:
(1) BCS attains a better service identification
accuracy than BS, but BS has a significant
advantage regarding the association rate. BCS gives a
19.04%–35.93% lower association rate than BS, but
BCS gives a 10.9%–15.03% more accurate A1 than
BS and a 0.1%–10.88% more accurate A2. Since BCS
requires that the associated DNS request and HTTPS
flow come from the same client, its ability to accurately
label the associated data is obviously stronger than that
of BS (i.e., BCS is significantly better than BS with
regard to the A1 indicator). However, HTTPS flows
with invisible DNS requests in the time window are
not associated by BCS, which affects the association
rate (i.e., the association rate R of BCS is significantly
lower than that of BS). BS does not consider the client
and can associate and mark HTTPS flows with missing
DNS requests using the related DNS requests of other
clients; however, this will reduce the accuracy because
the domain name requested preference determined
from all clients does not reflect the domain name
requested behaviour of a particular client very well.
The experimental data shown in Fig. 8 verifies this
conclusion.
(2) DTA-HOC takes full advantage of BCS and
BCS
BS
DTA-HOC
DN-Hunter

80

60

40

BCS
BS
DTA-HOC
DN-Hunter

80

Value (%)

Value (%)

BS. The service identification effect of DTA-HOC
is better than that of those two methods in general.
For association rate R, DTA-HOC performs as well
as BS and better than BCS; for specific accuracy,
DTA-HOC performs 10%–16% better than BS and
0.3%–0.6% worse than BCS; for A2, DTA-HOC
performs significantly better (11%–16%) than the other
two methods.
(3) Compared with DN-Hunter, DTA-HOC performs
better for R, A1, and A2 in general. The association
rate R of DTA-HOC is 13%–19% higher than that of
DN-Hunter, A1 is 2%–3% higher, and A2 is 11%–13%
higher.
Specifically, on dataset 3:00 to 4:00, the A1 of DTAHOC is 9% lower than that of DN-Hunter and 8.6% than
that of BCS. The main reason is that the ratio of HTTP
flows associated in the second level of DTA-HOC on
the dataset 3:00–4:00 is much higher than on the other
datasets. The ratio on the dataset 3:00–4:00 comes up
to 42%, but it is 23% on the other dataset. The increase
in the ratio of second-level associations reduces the
specific accuracy of DTA-HOC. The reason for the firstlevel association rate decrease will be discussed in the
next subsection. Actually, A2 of DTA-HOC is 13.4%
higher than that of DN-Hunter. That is to say, DTAHOC has a superior capacity to accurately identify more
HTTP flows than DN-Hunter.
Therefore, DTA-HOC is superior to the other
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Fig. 8 Performance comparison between BCS, BS, DTA-HOC, and DN-Hunter. (a) Comparison results on dataset 10:00–11:00;
(b) comparison results on dataset 16:00–17:00; (c) comparison results on dataset 20:00–21:00; and (d) comparison results on
dataset 3:00–4:00.
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methods at HTTP traffic service identification.
Moreover, based on the previous analysis of the
relationship between HTTPS and HTTP, DTA-HOC
also has better service identification capabilities on
HTTPS traffic.
We also analyzed the various evaluation indicators of
DTA-HOC on the offline datasets under the specified
parameters. As seen in Table 3, DTA-HOC can
associate approximately 83.33%–91.18% of HTTP
flows with DNS. Approximately 46.79%–56.11% of
HTTP flows had the service accurately labelled, and
approximately 65.25%–78% of HTTP flows can have
the service marked by the public suffix. Moreover, the
specific accuracy of HTTP flow service identification
based on multiple candidate domain names can reach
90%, and the generic accuracy can reach 96.04%. These
experimental results further verify that DTA-HOC is
effective at distinguishing the service of HTTP flows.
5.3.3

Discussion

Here we discuss why some HTTP flows cannot
be associated or accurately classified in the HTTP
experiments.
(1) Non-association analysis
In our experiments, it was assumed that campus
network users use the campus network local DNS
service to access the Internet. However, some users do
not use the local DNS service; therefore, their DNS
request/response data will not pass through the DNS
data collection point. The HTTP traffic generated by
this group of users at the campus network border has
no associated DNS requests. To analyze the impact of
this phenomenon on the experimental association rate,
we extract the server IP address(es) and the request
hostname(s) from the unrelated HTTP flows, and then
retrieve them in the DNS response data over the past one
day to determine whether the pair of server IP address
and request hostname appears simultaneously in a DNS
response record. We then estimate the percentage of
Table 3
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unallocated HTTP traffic caused by not using the local
DNS. The experimental results show that 92.51% of
non-associated server IP addresses do not appear in
DNS response data in the period from 3:00 to 4:00,
and the proportion in the other three time periods is
98%, 98.2%, and 99.32%, respectively. Therefore, the
main reason for non-associated occurrences is that some
users in the campus network do not use the local DNS
service. This problem can be solved by adding DNS
traffic at the same collection point as HTTP traffic. If
this factor is excluded, the association rate of DTAHOC can reach 99.84%, and almost all HTTP flows can
be associated.
In addition, since the time window size limits the
amount of DNS flows that can be obtained in each
time slice, domain name invisibility would result in
DNS flows that correspond to partial HTTP flows to
be absent in the time slice. According the previous
experiment, 7.59% of the non-associated HTTP flows in
the 3:00–4:00 period occur because the corresponding
DNS requests are missing in the time slice. Further, we
counted the average TTL value of the requested domain
names and a proportion  over the four experimental
time periods, where  is the proportion of HTTP
flows whose duration is greater than DNS sliding time
window size w in all HTTPS flows. The experimental
results show that the average value of TTL during the
period from 3:00 to 4:00 is 3584 seconds, which is 2to 3-fold that of the other three periods (1504, 1112,
and 1043 seconds). Additionally, proportion  during
the period from 3:00 to 4:00 is 0.1%, which is 2- to
3-fold that of the other three periods (0.03%, 0.04%,
and 0.05%). The results further verify that domain name
query invisibility is more prone to appear during the
3:00–4:00 period. This analysis is consistent with the
results in Fig. 8; i.e., the value of indicator R in the
3:00–4:00 period is significantly lower than that of the
other three periods, and the first level association rate of

w D 15, x D y D b D 1).
Classification results based on DTA-HOC for HTTP (w

Time duration
10:00–11:00
16:00–17:00
20:00–21:00
3:00–4:00

R
91.03
91.18
89.21
83.33

A1
61.64
59.44
59.01
56.16

PSA1
86.16
85.46
84.37
78.31

P2A1
72.99
70.38
71.01
68.52

P2SA1
92.65
92.24
90.97
85.43

P3A1
79.28
76.68
77.17
73.5

P3SA1
94.47
94.39
93.41
86.89

FA1
90
88.3
87.94
80.36

(%)
FSA1
96.04
95.99
95.01
88.13

Time duration
10:00–11:00
16:00–17:00
20:00–21:00
3:00–4:00

R
91.03
91.18
89.21
83.33

A2
56.11
54.2
52.64
46.79

PSA2
78.42
77.92
75.27
65.25

P2A2
66.44
64.17
63.35
57.09

P2SA2
84.33
84.1
81.16
71.18

P3A2
72.16
69.92
68.85
61.25

P3SA2
85.99
86.06
83.33
72.4

FA2
81.92
80.51
78.45
66.96

FSA2
87.42
87.52
84.76
73.44
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DTA-HOC is also much lower.
(2) Inaccuracy analysis
Through the analysis of inaccurate data, we
found that HTTP requested hostnames, such as wx?.
sinaimg.cn, dldir?.qq.com, img?.imgtn.bdimg.com, etc.
(where “?” indicates the number 1, 2, 3, etc.),
have a high service identification error rate. Further
analysis found this problem is due to the HTTP1.1
specification. The specification defines that the client
should not establish more than two HTTP links with
the server; if this limit is exceeded, the new connection
will be blocked. Web browsers such as IE strictly
abide by this rule[18] ; for example, when a web page
displays multiple images, the IE user’s image download
speed will be affected. To solve the bottleneck caused
by displaying multiple images on the same webpage,
many large websites, such as Baidu and Sina, use the
same group of image servers and multiple second-level
domain names to increase the number of simultaneous
image download connections. Therefore, in a webpage
request, there are multiple different domain names that
point to the same server IP address, and the query
times and access times of these domain names are
both basically the same. That is, in a very small time
slice, multiple domain name requests parsed to the
same IP address are interleaved with the corresponding
HTTP communication. Existing DNS-based web traffic
service identification schemes (including our method)
are currently unable to distinguish this situation.
Further analysis shows that the assigned domain
names of some HTTPS flows that were not accurately
marked have the public suffix as their actual hostname.
Although the designated flow identifier by DAT-HOC
is not the same as the actual hostname, this does not
affect the service identification accuracy of the HTTP
flow service.
Additionally, we find that there are many mismatches
caused by certain CDN domain names. These CDN
domain names from DNS flows have different
public suffixes than the requested hostname of
the HTTP flow, but they have a certain degree
of similarity in text characteristics to the actual
hostname requests. For example, p1.music.126.net and
p1.music.126.net.wscdns.com have the same service
domain name as the third-level sub-domain of CDN;
for c.hiphotos.baidu.com and hiphotos.jomodns.com,
the two domain names have different public suffixes,
but the three-level subdomains have high similarity.
Therefore, we use the Levenshtein distance and the Jaro
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distance algorithms to measure the textual similarity
between the candidate domain name and the requested
hostname on the second-level sub-domain and the thirdlevel sub-domain. From these algorithms we find that
there is a similarity between the first candidate domain
name and the requested hostname for 48% of HTTP
flows. That is, the selected candidate domain names
in the above scenarios can identify the service of
flows effectively although they do not match the actual
hostnames of the flows.
5.4

Online performance on HTTPS

DTA-HOC is deployed to the online environment of the
campus network, and real-time DNS flows and HTTPS
flows are read from the streaming data platform with the
same time window parameters as used for the offline
environment. The data input rate and the actual data
processing time on the big data platform are shown in
Fig. 9. The processing time of a minute of data takes
only 20 seconds or less, which meets the real-time
processing requirements of large-scale network traffic.
The association results are further visualized in
Fig. 10, which shows the total number of HTTPS
flows, the number of associated HTTPS flows, and
the change of the association rate over time. As seen
in Fig. 10, the change of the associated flow number
curve is in good agreement with the change of the
total flow number curve. The association rate ranges
from 55% to 89%, and the average association rate
based on time accumulation is approximately 83%. The
association rate fluctuates over time. Similar to the

(a)

(b)

Fig. 9 Data input rate and total processing time in the
online environment. (a) Data input rate, where x-coordinate
represents time (minute) and y-coordinate represents the
average number of input records per second in one minute.
(b) Total processing time, where x-coordinate represents time
(minute) and y-coordinate represents time spent processing
data in one minute (the diagrams obtained from the Job
Streaming monitoring webpage provided by the big data
platform).

Xuemei Zeng et al.: DTA-HOC: Online HTTPS Traffic Service Identification Using DNS in Large-Scale Networks
Raw HTTPS
Associated HTTPS

Association ratio

100

Average association ratio

200 000

90

150 000

80

100 000

70

50 000

60

0
:00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00 :00
17 21 01 05 09 13 17 21 01 05 09 13 17 21 01 05 09
Time

Association ratio on flows (%)

Total number of flows

250 000

50

Fig. 10 Number of associated HTTPS flows online and the
change of the association rate over time (per minute).

HTTP experiments, the association rate in the early
morning hours was significantly lower than that in the
later morning hours.
Based on the analysis of HTTP offline experiments,
we consider the following three reasons for why some
HTTPS flows are not associated. The first reason is the
domain name query invisibility caused by the position
of the DNS data collection point. If the impact of DNS
collection points on the correlation results is ignored,
the average association rate will increase to at least
90%. The second reason is the DNS query invisibility
caused by the sliding time window mechanism. Similar
to the HTTP experimental scenario, the DNS caching
mechanism leads the corresponding DNS queries of
some HTTPS flows to not fall into the current time
window, a phenomenon that is more prominent in
the early morning hours on the campus network. We
find that the above two reasons are the main causes
for the association rate of HTTPS flows in the early
morning hours being significantly lower than in other
time periods. The third reason is that some HTTPS
applications hardcode IP addresses directly into URLs
and do not send DNS requests. DTA-HOC assumes
the existence of the corresponding DNS query before
HTTPS communication and is invalid for applications
that only use IP addresses to provide services.

6

in a large-scale network environment. Additionally,
DTA-HOC does not depend on prior knowledge
of the identified webpage. Moreover, our proposed
method might contribute to the identification of other
applications that perform DNS communication before
establishing a connection.
However, DTA-HOC is insufficient in two aspects.
First, the method is still affected by the domain name
ambiguity problem caused by webpage optimization
against the limited number of permitted web browser
connections. Second, the effectiveness of the method
depends on the visibility of DNS traffic in the network;
therefore, the method will be invalid if there are no DNS
queries related to the HTTPS flow from the client or if
applications and services do not rely on DNS and work
with IP addresses only. We aim to propose a further
method to solve the above problems in future work to
achieve an in-depth analysis of encrypted traffic.
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